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AMBUSHING THE OLYMPIC GAMES
ROBERT N. DAVIS
I. INTRODUCTION
"Ambush" or "parasite" marketing may not be illegal, but many
Olympic sponsors believe that companies engaged in the practice
should be punished. Both of these terms have been used in the
marketing industry to describe a company that is not an official
sponsor of an event but, because its advertising campaign is cen-
tered around the event, appears to be one of the official sponsors.1
While the non-sponsoring company may not use official logos and
other trademarks associated with the sporting event, nothing
prohibits the company from airing a commercial featuring former
Olympians endorsing its product and saying, "We will see you in
Atlanta at game time."
Ambush is defined as "a lying in wait to attack by surprise," "a
surprise attack made from a concealed position" and "to hide in the
bushes."2 Parasite is defined as "any organism that grows, feeds,
and is sheltered on or in a different organism while contributing
nothing to the survival of its host" and "a person who habitually
takes advantage of the generosity of others without making any use-
ful return."3
Whether these definitions befit the practice is debatable.
Many industry executives say it is not ambush marketing at all, but
rather corrective advertising.4 Others say that the prices for spon-
sorships are exorbitant and ambush marketing is creative advertis-
ing for those companies who cannot or will not pay excessive prices
for exclusive rights packages. 5
1. Sponsorship has been defined to include things which indicate approval,
permission or authorization. JohnJ. Voortman, Trademark Licensing of Names, Insig-
nia, Characters and Designs: The Current Status of the Boston Pro Hockey Per Se Infringe-
ment Rule, 22 J. MARsHALL L. REv. 567, 569 n.12 (1989). Mr. Voortman further
noted that "[t ]he purpose of trademark protection is to convey accurate informa-
tion to consumers as to the source or sponsorship of products." Id. at 569 (foot-
note omitted).
2. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 41 (1st ed. 1976).
3. Id. at 953.
4. Geoffrey Brewer, Be Like Nike? Ambush Marketers Cash in on Major Events
Without Laying Out Enormous Sponsorship Fees; Should You Just Do It?, SALES & MAR-
KETING MGMT., Sept. 1, 1993, at 66, 68.
5. Id. (stating that "[a]mbushers figure they can identify themselves with an
event without having to shell out exorbitant fees").
(423)
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The purpose of this Article is to explore the practice of am-
bush marketing and its impact on the Olympic Games. Part II of
the Article discusses particular examples of ambush marketing.6
Part III discusses National Hockey League (NHL) v. Pepsi-Cola Canada
Ltd.,7 the only legal decision to squarely address the practice of am-
bush marketing.8 Part IV of the Article examines the Amateur
Sports Act of 1978 which gives the United States Olympic Commit-
tee (USOC) exclusive control over the use of Olympic symbols,
emblems and names.9 Part IV also discusses the Sponsor Protection
Program (SPP) of the Atlanta Centennial Olympic Properties
(ACOP) .10 Part V of the Article concludes with an evaluation of the
efforts of the Sponsor Protection Program in light of the current
law. 1 1
II. AMBUSH MARKETING OR AGGREssrvE PROMOTION?
The cost of sponsorships have skyrocketed, particularly since
the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games. 12 In 1992, corporate spon-
sors in the United States paid an estimated $3.2 billion for sponsor-
ships. 13 This figure reflected an increase from $2.8 billion in 1991
and $1 billion in 1986.14 In 1980, the organizers for the Lake
Placid Winter Olympics signed up 300 commercial sponsors, but
together these sponsors provided less than $10 million in cash.1 5
Peter Ueberroth, President of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Or-
ganizing Committee (LAOOC), and his assistant Joel Rubenstein
decided to maintain only thirty Olympic sponsorships and require a
$4 million minimum payment.1 6 Currently, companies will pay as
6. For a discussion of various examples of ambush marketing, see infra notes
18-58 and accompanying text.
7. 92 D.L.R.4th 349 (B.C. 1992).
8. For a discussion of NtHL v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Ltd., see infra notes 63-82 and
accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, see infra notes 83-99
and accompanying text.
10. For a discussion of Sponsor Protection Program (SPP), see infra notes
100-117 and accompanying text.
11. For an evaluation of the SPP, see infra Part V.
12. Brewer, supra note 4, at 68.
13. Id. United States corporations spent approximately two-thirds of the $3.2
billion on sponsoring sporting events, teams, or athletic leagues. Id.
14. Id.
15. PETER UEBERROTH, MADE IN AME.IucA 61 (1985).
16. Id. The City of Los Angeles refused to finance the 1984 Olympic Games
after the City of Montreal lost more than $1 billion hosting the 1976 Summer
Olympics. Frederick H. Lowe, Team Players - Firms Seek High Profile At Low Cost, CHI.
SuN-TIMES, July 24, 1994, (Moneylife), at 1. As a result of Montreal's experience,
Ueberroth and Rubenstein designed their plan to increase the value of being an
[Vol. III: p. 423
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much as $40 million to become an official sponsor of the 1996 Sum-
mer Olympics.' 7 Ironically, as the Olympic sponsorship program
has become more financially productive, the temptation to ambush
a competitor increases.
A. 1992 Barcelona Summer Olympics
1. Visa and American Express
In 1992, Visa paid approximately $20 million to sponsor the
Summer Olympics in Barcelona, Spain and the Winter Olympics in
Albertville, France. 18 In addition, Visa spent millions on a market-
ing campaign designating itself as the official credit card of the
1992 Olympics. 19 One of Visa's television campaigns made a frontal
assault on one of its competitors, American Express (AmEx), by
stating " '[t] he Olympics don't take American Express [.]' "20
In response to the Visa commercial, AmEx aired an ad with
winter sports athletes telling viewers that "to enjoy the 'fun and
games' they 'don't need a Visa.' "21 AmEx intended the commer-
cial to show that many stores, restaurants and hotels in Albertville,
France accepted the AmEx card.22 After this ad aired, Visa claimed
that AmEx carried out an ambush marketing strategy.23 AmEx
countered by saying that this charge was unfounded because Visa
initiated the confrontation and it was merely setting the record
straight.24
Olympic sponsor and to decrease the LAOOC's advertising expenditures. UEBER-
ROTH, supra note 15, at 61.
17. Brewer, supra note 4, at 68. In 1994, companies paid approximately $9.5
million to officially sponsor the Winter Olympics. Id.
18. Id. at 67.
19. Id.
20. Id. This claim was technically true because part of the Visa sponsorship
package provided that official Olympic ticket and merchandise vendors were au-
thorized to accept only Visa credit cards. Id.
21. Id.
22. Brewer, supra note 4, at 67.
23. Id. at 68. Although the American Express commercial focused on winter
sporting events, it never used the word Olympics. Id. John Bennett, a Senior Vice
President for Visa USA, stated that American Express commercials portrayed the
"look, feel, and implication of the Olympics[.]" Id. Visa thus claimed that such
portrayal confused consumers into thinking that AmEx helped sponsor the Olym-
pics. Id.
24. Id. Warner J. Canto, a Senior Vice President of Marketing Communic:-
tions for American Express Travel Related Services, stated that "[t ] his wasn't para-
site marketing. It was corrective advertising. We'll do whatever it takes to correct
any misleading impressions Visa creates." Id.
1996]
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2. Mike, Inc. and Reebok International, Ltd.
Another example of ambush marketing or aggressive promo-
tion occurred at the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games between two
sports apparel manufacturers, Nike, Inc. (Nike) and Reebok Inter-
national, Ltd. (Reebok). At the 1992 Olympic medal ceremonies,
athletes wore jackets made by Reebok, an official Olympic spon-
sor.25 Nike, however, conducted a highly visible advertising cam-
paign without "paying a penny in [Olympic] sponsorship fees." 26
Nike held press conferences for Olympic athletes under contract
with Nike and additionally displayed large murals of U.S.A. basket-
ball team members on the side of Barcelona buildings. 27 In sup-
port of its advertising campaign, Nike Divisional Manager Mark
Pilkenton stated "[w]e feel like in any major sporting event, we have
the right to come in and give our message as long as we don't inter-
fere with the official proceedings."2 8
B. Major Sports Leagues
All of the major sports leagues prohibit non-sponsors from us-
ing league logos, official team uniforms, hats and insignia in adver-
tisements, but nothing prohibits them from sponsoring individual
teams. Most recently, National Football League Properties (NFLP)
sued the Dallas Cowboys for $300 million because Jerry Jones, the
team owner, independently negotiated a ten-year, $25 million deal
with Pepsi-Cola to replace Coca-Cola, an NFLP sponsor, at the Dal-
las Cowboys stadium.29
Much to the National Football League's (NFL) dismay, Mr.
Jones does not want to do business through NFLP but would rather
each team negotiate deals independently. 30 That is the last thing
the NFL wants to see happen. In the lawsuit filed in a United States
District Court, the NFL argued that Mr. Jones engaged in a scheme
to destroy the structure of NFLP in order to gain a " 'more than
25. Id. at 69.
26. Id.
27. Brewer, supra note 4, at 69. The Nike murals and the Nike press confer-
ences involved Michael Jordan, an American basketball star. Id.
28. Id. Reebok maintained the position that "[w]e proceed with our game
plan regardless of what Nike does." Id.
29. Richard Sandomir, Dollars and Dallas: League of Their Own?, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 24, 1995, § 3, at 1. In September 1995, Jones negotiated a deal with Nike, a
non-NFLP sponsor, for $2.5 million to paint its trademark "Swoosh" on the Cow-
boys' stadium, develop a theme park and provide Cowboys personnel with Nike
clothing. Id. Additionally, Jones was rumored to be negotiating with American
Express and AT&T, the competitors of two NFLP sponsors, Visa USA and GTE. Id.
30. Id.
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equal share of licensing revenue.' "31 Jones maintained that he did
not violate any NFL restriction because the Nike and Pepsi-Cola
agreements are with the stadium, not the Dallas Cowboys.32
Paul Tagliabue, the NFL Commissioner, and Sara Levinson,
the NFLP President, believe that Mr. Jones' actions are contrary to
the best interests of the NFL and the other NFL teams. 33 The Dal-
las Cowboys, of course, are a great asset to the NFLP. Dallas Cow-
boys merchandise accounted for 20.3 percent of the NFLP's retail
sales. 34 Mr. Jones maintained that if his team only had a two per-
cent share of the sales, he would still prefer to negotiate deals
independently.3 5
If the NFL/Cowboys' lawsuit goes to trial, the "focus will be on
the [NFL]'s inner operations and could examine the antitrust im-
plications of a partnership whose members cooperate by sharing
their gate receipts, television fees and [NFLP] revenues."36 Profes-
sor Paul Weiler of Harvard Law School stated that two possible is-
sues emerging at trial would be "whether the [NFLP's] exclusive
contract can be extended to cover stadium licenses . . . [and]
whether the [NFLP] contract violates antitrust law as a restraint of
trade."37
Within the National Basketball Association (NBA), no rules ex-
ist to prevent companies from signing NBA players to advertising
contracts. 38 In the past, Pepsi-Cola signed Shaquille O'Neal to en-
dorse its soft drink even though Coca-Cola was the official NBA
sponsor.3 9 Even though O'Neal did not wear a NBA uniform dur-
ing his Pepsi commercial, one must ask whether the Pepsi-Cola
31. Id. (quoting NFL's complaint filed in United States District Court).
32. Id. (quoting Jones as stating "[iun my mind, there is no issue of the rules
not being followed").
33. Id. Currently, NFLP has experienced a 400 percent revenue growth since
1988 and it encompasses 325 licensees and 35 corporate sponsors. Id. Tagliabue
and Levinson foresee the value of NFLP sponsorships decreasing if Jones' actions
are deemed acceptable, thereby destroying the essential purpose of the NFLP, to
promote the NFL. Id.
34. Sandomir, supra note 29, at 1. The San Francisco 49ers, the NFL team
accounting for the second highest retail sales, maintains an 11.3 percent share. Id.
35. Id. In 1990, when its record stood at 1-15, the Dallas Cowboys' retail sales
accounted for a mere two percent of NFLP's retail sales. Id.
36. Id. Apparently, Mr.Jones does not mind sharing television and gate reve-
nues. Id.
37. Id. Professor Weiler further opined that "[I]acking an antitrust exemp-
tion to market on a league wide basis, 'the [NFL] clearly does not have the right to
control stadium deals.'" Id.
38. Brewer, supra note 4, at 70.
39. Id.
1996] 427
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advertising undermined Coca-Cola's NBA sponsorship?40 David
Schreff, NBA Properties Vice President of Media and Sponsor Pro-
grams, stated that "[t] hat's close to an ambush.... [b]ut we respect
the rights of our players to go out and secure endorsement."41
C. 1994 World Cup
The 1994 World Cup fell victim not only to ambush marketing
in its purest sense, but also to counterfeiting.42 Ambush marketing
does not come close to the kind of legal violation caused by direct
counterfeiting. In 1994, the World Cup was held in the United
States for the first time.43 More than 300 companies were given
rights to sell official products throughout the world and at least
nineteen companies paid as much as $75 million each to be major
sponsors.44 Many sponsorships sold for between $10 and $20 mil-
lion.45 However, unlicensed products bearing the World Cup mas-
cot, such as T-shirts, hats and posters, appeared in the weeks prior
to the tournament. 46 Unlike the situations previously discussed, the
following are examples of outright trademark violations which can
be legally prosecuted.
In 1994, the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York enjoined Sprint Communications (Sprint) from
issuing cards bearing the World Cup mark.47 In March 1991, the
International Soccer League (ISL) entered into an agreement with
Mastercard International (Mastercard) which allowed Mastercard
to be an official sponsor of the 1994 World Cup.48 The sponsorship
agreement granted Mastercard the exclusive right to use the World
40. Id.
41. Id. (citation omitted).
42. Mitch Gelman, Fits Over Fakes World Cup Sponsors Target Knock-offs, NEWS-
DAY, May 26, 1994, at A4. The World Cup, a soccer tournament held every five
years, is the largest single-sport event in the world. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.; Ronald Grover & Greg Bums, The World Cup of Ambush Marketing, Bus.
WrL, May 2, 1994, at 37.
45. Lowe, supra note 16, at 1.
46. Gelman, supra note 42 at A4. Experts predicted that the sale of unli-
censed World Cup products would reach nearly $150 million world-wide and $45
million within the United States. Id.
47. Mastercard Int'l Inc. v. Sprint Communications, No. 94 CIV. 1051 (JSM),
1994 WL 97097, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 1994).
48. Id. at *1.
[Vol. III: p. 423
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Cup '94 trademarks on " '[a]ll card-based payment and account ac-
cess devices.' "149
Subsequently, in May 1992, Sprint entered into an agreement
to become an Official Partner of the 1994 World Cup.50 This agree-
ment was restrictive and expressly limited Official Partners' rights
to not "infringe upon the rights of Official Sponsors."51 Sprint in-
terpreted its Official Partner status to permit the issuance of
100,000 telephone cards bearing the World Cup mark.5 2 The dis-
trict court addressed the issue of contract interpretation, not am-
bush marketing.5 3 The court held that the Sprint cards fell under
the definition of card-based payment and account access devices
and prohibited Sprint from using the World Cup logo.54 Fur-
thermore, the court determined that "extrinsic evidence demon-
strate[d] that both Mastercard and ISL intended that Mastercard
should have the exclusive right to use the World Cup marks for
telephone calling cards."55
49. Id. (quoting agreement between ISL and Mastercard). In essence, Master-
card could place the World Cup trademark on all plastic services cards including,
but not limited to, credit cards, check guarantee cards and charge cards. Id.
50. Id. In May 1991, ISL entered into an agreement with the Local Organiz-
ing Committee (LOC) for the 1994 World Cup Games. Id. This agreement al-
lowed the LOC the "right to contract with corporations which would serve as
official partners" to the 1994 World Cup. Id. Sprint subsequently entered into its
agreement with the LOC. Id.
51. Id. The agreement between ISL and the LOC further provided that" 'of-
ficial partners shall not have the right to use the marks on any card-based payment
and account access devices.' " Id. (quoting agreement between ISL and LOC).
However, Sprint had permission to use World Cup logos and marks in promotions,
advertising and marketing. Id.
52. Mastercard Int'l Inc., 1994 WL 97097 at *1. Sprint's cards did not contain
the magnetic stripe that the Mastercard cards contained, which prevented them
from being "scanned by a cardreader." Id. Mastercard sought preliminary and
permanent injunction against Sprint to prevent any further issuance of the cards
or other activities which would infringe upon their rights guaranteed under the
ISL/Mastercard agreement. Id.
53. Id. at *2. The court asked specifically whether Mastercard was "granted by
ISL an exclusive license for the World Cup marks which precludes Sprint from
using those marks on the payment cards which it has issued and plans to issue in
connection with its World Cup promotion?" Id.
54. Id. (holding that "on the basis of the contract language alone, the Court
finds that Mastercard's interpretation of the language is correct and Sprint's use of
the World Cup marks is prohibited").
55. Id. This intent was demonstrated by a telephone call to ISL from the
LOC. Id. During the Sprint negotiations, a LOC representative called the ISL to
ask whether it could license Sprint to use World Cup marks on telephone calling
cards. Id. Stephen Dixon, Managing Director of ISL, responded in a memoran-
dum, stating:
I am sorry to say that you cannot allow U.S. Sprint to use the 1994 World
Cup emblem on calling cards in any manner whatsoever. At the time of
1996]
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Time Warner Sports Merchandising, the company that li-
censed official products for the World Cup, took legal action
against more than 105 manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers to
prevent the sale of counterfeit products. 56 Numerous stories exist
detailing the problem of counterfeit goods making their way into
the United States, including soccer ball decorations in a New York
deli5 7 and sweatshirts in Miami.58 These examples are legally ac-
tionable because many of the products are copies of protected
trademarks. A true ambusher, however, is not engaged in such di-
rect counterfeiting.
III. THE LAW OF AMBUSH MARKETING
The difficulty with ambush marketing is that the law is on
the side of the ambushers. 59 Purely defined, ambush marketing
does not involve counterfeiting or the illegal use of trademarks,
tradenames or symbols. Companies simply develop a creative ad-
vertising campaign around the event, never use the event logo,
trademark or tradename and capitalize by association with the
event without paying for official sponsor status.60 While many peo-
signature of the Mastercard agreement, we had a long and heated debate
over this particular topic and we lost the argument.
Id. Thus, Mastercard and ISL clearly viewed telephone credit cards as coming
within the terms of its agreement and Mastercard did not wish to sublicense those
rights to any other company. Id.
56. Gelman, supra note 42, at A4. Some of the counterfeit or unlicensed
World Cup merchandise was smuggled into the United States from various coun-
tries, including South Korea, Pakistan, Taiwan, China, Mexico and Columbia. Id.
57. Id. The manager of the Fiesta Mexico purchased several strings of soccer
ball lanterns to sell in his New York City deli. Id. The lanterns contained the
phrase "USA '94 - World Cup" and a replica of the World Cup trophy. Id. When
asked where he purchased the merchandise, the manager stated he purchased the
lanterns from a Pakistani distributor for $4.50 and he sells them for $6.99. Id.
United States Customs officials seized 7,000 of the colorful soccer ball lanterns in
Kennedy Airport and 3,800 in Los Angeles. Id. It was estimated that the merchan-
dise that sold for $6.99 in New York City cost less than 50 cents to produce in
Pakistan. Id.
58. Id. In April 1995, United States Customs officials "seized a shipment of
sweatshirts and T-shirts featuring the ball-and-flag logo and tags depicting Striker
with 'World Cup USA '94 - Official Licensed Product' printed below." Id.
59. See Steve McKelvey, Sans Legal Restraint, No Stopping Brash, Creative Ambush
Marketers, BRANDWEEK, Apr. 18, 1994, at 20 (stating that "[c]ompanies engaged in
ambush marketing have a key element in their favor: the law").
60. One commentator has defined ambush marketing, in its most offensive
form, to mean the "intentional efforts of one company to weaken, or 'ambush,' a
competitor's official association with a sports organization, which has been ac-
quired through the payment of sponsorship fees." Stephen M. McKelvey, Atlanta
'96: Olympic Countdown to Ambush Armageddon?, 4 SETON HALLJ. SPoRTs L. 397, 401
(1994) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter Mckelvey, Atlanta '96]. In more general
terminology, ambush marketing may refer to an attempt by a company to "capital-
8
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ple complain that this practice involves a question of business eth-
ics, others say it is simply aggressive advertising. 61 Thus, smart
lawyers can devise strategies for corporate clients that stay on the
legal side of the trademark rights dispute.62
The only case to directly address the contours of ambush
marketing is NHL v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Ltd.63 This case arose out of
ize on the goodwill, reputation, and popularity of a particular sport or sporting
event by creating an association without the authorization or consent of the neces-
sary parties." Id. (footnote omitted).
61. McKelvey, Atlanta '96, supra note 60, at 402 (stating that "the typical re-
sponse of sports organizers has been a cry for 'business ethics' and a verbal flog-
ging of the ambusher. But those so-called public embarrassment campaigns have
proven largely ineffective"),
62. Id. (stating "corporations have become increasingly more sophisticated
... in their ability to blur the lines between legal marketing activity protected by
the commercial and free speech provisions of the First Amendment and the fair-
use defense, and promotion and advertising that constitutes trademark infringe-
ment and/or unfair competition") (footnotes omitted); McKelvey, supra note 59,
at 20 (stating that "[w]ith a little creativity and legal guidance, there's very little
that can be done to stop ambush marketing").
63. 92 D.L.R.4th 349 (B.C. 1992). While this is the only decision to squarely
address ambush marketing, there have been a number of decisions in the trade-
mark infringement area that are worth reading. In Host Communications, Inc. v.
Kellogg Co., Civ. Action No. 94-26 (E.D. Ky. 1994) (unpublished) the district court
granted a preliminary injunction initially, then a permanent injunction, against
Kellogg Company for trademark infringement. The court held that Kellogg's un-
authorized use of the NCAA marks and the references to the Tournament were
likely to cause confusion regarding whether Kellogg's products were approved by
the NCAA. The court discussed Kellogg's misrepresentation of its affiliation with
the NCAA Tournament and the resultant prospect of the diminution in value of
Host Communications rights granted by the NCAA.
In The New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publishing, Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir.
1992), USA Today and The Star conducted public opinion polls regarding the popu-
lar music group The New Kids on the Block. Id. at 304. The polls asked which of
the five members was the reader's favorite. Id. Readers could call in their votes.
Id. The New Kids filed a complaint raising ten claims, most focusing on concern
that the newspaper's use of their name implied that The New Kids sponsored the
polls. Id. at 304-05. The Court held that the newspapers were entitled to nomina-
tive fair use, that is, the words New Kids on the Block could be used for descriptive
purposes, and there was no implicit or explicit sponsorship by The New Kids on
the Block. Id. at 309.
Similarly, in WCVB-TVv. Boston Athletic Ass'n, 926 F.2d 42 (1st Cir. 1991), the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's
refusal to enjoin a television broadcast of the Boston marathon. Id. at 44. The
court held that Channel 5's use of the words "Boston Marathon" was not likely to
cause confusion because Channel 5 used the words merely to describe the event
and was not conducting its own marathon. Id. at 46.
See also National Football League v. Governor of State of Delaware, 435 F. Supp. 1372
(D. Del. 1977). In that case, the district court held that the state of Delaware's
football lottery did not constitute a misappropriation of league property even
though the lottery was based on regularly scheduled NFL games. Id. at 1378. Fur-
ther, the lottery did not use the NFL name or any registered service marks for the
purpose of identification, but only to describe the lottery. Id. at 1380. The district
court ordered limited relief in the form of a required disclaimer because the court
1996]
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a Pepsi-Cola (Pepsi) advertising campaign during the Spring of
1990 called the "Diet Pepsi $4,000,000 Pro Hockey Playoff Pool."64
This campaign was centered around the National Hockey League
(NHL) play off games and the Stanley Cup, but Pepsi was neither
an NHL sponsor, nor did it use any NHL official logos. 6 5
National Hockey League Services (NHLS), the licensing arm
of the NHL, entered into an agreement with Coca-Cola Ltd. (Coke)
as an official sponsor of the NHL for approximately $2.6 million in
the Spring of 1989.66 Coke obtained the rights to use NHL symbols
for its promotional programs in Canada and the United States.67
Through this agreement, however, Coke did not obtain "any right
to advertise during the broadcast in Canada of any televised [NHL]
games."68 The NHL, not the NHLS, controlled such television
rights and it sold them to Molson Breweries of Canada Ltd. (Mol-
son) in 1988 for a five year period.69
By contract with Molson, the Canadian Broadcasting Corpo-
ration (CBC) televises what is called Hockey Night in Canada
(HNIC), which includes at least one NHL game every Saturday
night during the regular season, many of the post-season playoff
games and the final Stanley Cup playoff games. 70 Molson sold
found that the Delaware lottery created an impression of sponsorship by the NFL.
Id. at 1381.
64. NHL v. Pepsi-Cola, 92 D.L.R.4th at 352. Pepsi also conducted a second
contest entitled "Pepsi's Shoot & Score Hockey Draft." Id. But the playoff pool
was the focus of the trial. Id.
65. Id. at 354-56. The contest involved collecting bottle cap liners or scratch
cards that contained predictions that certain teams may win in four, five, six or
seven games. Id. at 354. If you were the holder of the team who won on that
number, you won the grand prize. Id. at 354-55. The Pepsi-Cola bottles also con-
tained hang tags which contained the contest rules and a disclaimer which stated
"Diet Pepsi's $4,000,000 Pro Hockey Playoff Pool is neither associated with nor
sponsored by the [NHL] or any of its member teams or other affiliates." Id. at 355
(quotations omitted). The NHL's registered marks "include its name, a logo em-
blazoned with its initials, the names and logos.., of its member teams, and the
words 'Stanley Cup.' The names and logos of the member teams of the NHL are
also registered." Id. at 353.
The contest was promoted through television commercials and the print me-
dia. Id. at 355-56. For a description of Pepsi's advertising campaign, see id. at 354-
55.
66. Id. at 353.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. NHL v. Pepsi-Cola, 92 D.L.R. 4th at 353.
70. Id. at 353-54. Thus, Molson, as licensee of all the broadcast rights in Can-
ada, controlled the television broadcasts. Id. at 354.
10
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Pepsi the "right to be the exclusive advertiser of soft drinks during
the broadcast of all 'Hockey Night in Canada' games."71
In bringing its cause of action, the NHL argued that the Pepsi
contest, particularly the television commercials, conveyed a false
impression to the public that the NHL, in some form, approved or
was associated with the contest.72 Because there was no breach of
the agreement between the NHL and Coke, the NHL sought to
establish that Pepsi had interfered with that business relationship. 73
Conversely, Pepsi argued that the contest was "an aggressive but le-
gitimate marketing campaign."74
In deciding the issue, the court first described the tort of pass-
ing-off as a misrepresentation that "one's business is that of the
plaintiff, or connected with that of the plaintiff in any way likely to
cause damage."75 The court then enumerated the elements of the
tort of passing off.76 Applying these elements to the case, the court
71. Id. Even though Coke was the " 'official Soft Drink of the [NHL],' it had
no right to advertise its products during the 'Hockey Night in Canada' broadcasts."
Id.
72. Id. at 356. The NHL claimed that the use of various cities and states with
NHL teams inevitably would lead the public to the false impression. Id.
73. Id. at 369.
74. NHL v. Pepsi-Cola, 92 D.L.R.4th at 357. Pepsi "acknowledged that the Con-
test was geared toward obtaining the greatest commercial advantage from the pub-
licity [Pepsi's] products would receive during the Stanley Cup play-offs." Id.
75. Id. (quoting CHRISTOPHER WADLOW, THE LAW OF PASSING OFF 224 (1990)).
Passing off "consists in a false representation tending to induce buyers to believe
that the defendant's product is that of the plaintiff, usually but not always because
the plaintiff's product is better known or has a better reputation." W. PAGE KEE-
TON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 130, at 1015 (5th ed.
1984) (footnotes omitted).
Additionally, the tort of passing off was defined through the following
illustration:
This may be accomplished directly, as where a retailer fills orders for
Brand X by supplying Brand Y, but it is very commonly done by imitating
the plaintiff's trademarks, or names, wrappers, labels or containers, or his
vehicles, employee uniforms or the appearance of his place of business.
The same thing may be accomplished by using the plaintiff's name with
literal accuracy in connection with the defendant's product but in a way
that nevertheless suggests that the product is the plaintiff's or that he had
a role in it. The test laid down in such cases has been whether the resem-
blance is so great as to deceive the ordinary customer acting with the
caution usually exercised in such transactions, so that he may mistake one
for the other.
Id. at 1015-16 (footnotes omitted).
76. NHL v. Pepsi-Cola, 92 D.L.R14th at 358. The five elements of passing off
are as follows:
(1) a misrepresentation, (2) made by a trader in the course of trade, (3)
to prospective customers of his or ultimate consumers of goods or serv-
ices supplied by him, (4) which is calculated to injure the business or
goodwill of another trader ... and (5) which causes actual damage to a
1996] 433
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concluded that there is "nothing that would constitute direct inter-
ference by the defendant with the due performance of the
[NHLS]'s contractual relationship with Coke."77 The court contin-
ued, stating that although "the [NHLS]-Coke agreement obligates
[NHLS], so far as it is able, to protect the rights of Coke from
'ambush marketing,'"78 such an obligation cannot impose a duty
upon a third party to refrain from advertising in a manner which,
"although aggressive, is not, by the law of Canada, unlawful." 79
Thus, the court found that Pepsi was not in violation of Coke's
contract nor did its aggressive advertising campaign amount to the
tort of passing-off under Canadian law or infringe on registered
trademarks.80 To date, this has been the only judicial decision di-
rectly addressing the question of ambush marketing.8 1 Because this
is a Canadian case, it is not at all certain that its rationale will be
adopted by American courts. However, it is an understatement to
say that this decision supports those seeking to ambush, because it
widely opens the doors for ambushers so long as trademark and
tradename infringement is not a part of the campaign. 2 The NHL
v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Ltd. decision poses problems for the 1996
Olympic Games in Atlanta.
A possible method of attacking the practice of ambush market-
ing in the United States may be found in a false advertising claim
business or goodwill of the trader by whom the action is brought or ...
will probably do so.
Id. (quoting Erven Warnink Besloten Vennootschap v. J. Townend & Sons (Hull)
Ltd., [1979] A.C. 731 (H.L.)).
77. Id. at 369. The court reached this conclusion notwithstanding considera-
ble evidence indicating why the agreement was entered into with Coke rather than
the defendant (which also had sought the contract), and the fact that Coke was,
understandably, not pleased by the Pepsi contest. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. Additionally, the court reasoned:
It may be that, due to the failure of Coke to secure the right to advertise
its products during the television broadcasts of [HNIC] and the securing
of such rights by the defendant, the commercial value to Coke of the
right to describe its product as the "official soft drink of the [NHL]" has
less commercial value than would have been the case if Coke had also
obtained the right to advertise on [HNIC]. But that cannot diminish the
defendant's rights.
Id.
80. Id. at 371-72.
81. McKelvey, supra note 59, at 20 (stating that "only [NHL v. Pepsi-Cola Can-
ada Ltd.] begins to address the intangibles of ambush marketing").
82. Id. In response to NHL v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Ltd., Mr. McKelvey stated that
"the bottom line should be clear: unless and until a U.S. court creates a legal
cause of action against ambush marketing, such marketing will continue to be a
viable and legal tactic for those with fortitude and imagination to engage in it." Id.
12
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under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.8 3 The elements of a
prima facie case for an injunction under section 43(a) are that the
defendant:
(1) uses a false or misleading
(a) description of fact or
(b) representation of fact;
(2) in interstate commerce;
(3) and in connection with goods or services;
(4) in commercial advertising or promotion;
(5) when the description or representation misrepresents
the nature, qualities, or geographic origin of
(a) the defendant's goods, services or commercial ac-
tivities or
(b) the goods, services or commercial activities of an-
other person;
(6) and plaintiff has been or is likely to be damaged by
these acts. 84
Thus, under this statute, all a plaintiff need prove, in addition to
the above-listed elements, is likelihood of damage, because the Lan-
ham Act was designed to protect consumers as well as businesses
from the effects of false advertising.8 5 While there is no American
case on point, at least one scholar argues that ambush advertising
which creates a misleading impression of official sponsorship can
trigger a violation of section 43(a).86
IV. THE 1996 OLYMPIC GAMES
The United States Olympic Committee (USOC) is armed with
all of the powers of the Amateur Sports Act of 1978 (Act).87 This
Act was passed after recommendations were made in the Final Re-
port of the President's Commission on Olympic Sports. 88 The
United States Olympic program was in a state of disarray prior to
83. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
84. 3J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION § 27.04[1] [a] (3d ed. 1995) (footnote omitted).
85. See, e.g., Johnson &Johnson v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 631 F.2d 186, 190-92(2d Cir. 1980) ("Baby Oil" case is leading case holding that proof of impact from
lost sales is sufficient to support false advertising claim).
86. McCARTHY, supra note 84, § 27.07[2] [i].
87. 36 U.S.C. §§ 371-396 (1994).
88. 1 President's Commission on Olympic Sports, THE FINAL REPORT (1977).
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the passage of the 1978 Act.89 During a Senate debate in an earlier
attempt at congressional legislation, Senator Pearson from Kansas
detailed the problems with United States athletes in international
competition.90
The Act had the primary effect of reforming the USOC and
coordinating the development of international amateur athletic
competition.91 The real weapon, however, is found in section 380
of the Act, which gave the USOC the exclusive right to commer-
cially use Olympic symbols, emblems, trademarks and names.92
Section 380 and section 375 were critical to the financial survival of
the USOC. 93 As the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
89. James A.R. Nafziger, The Amateur Sports Act of 1978, 1983 B.Y.U. L. REv. 47,
47-50 (1983). For an excellent analysis of the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, see
generally id. at 50-78.
90. 93 CONG. REc. S15896-97 (1974) (statement of Sen. Pearson). These
problems culminated at the 1972 Munich Olympics when (1) an American swim-
mer had to surrender a gold medal because a USOC doctor did not report that an
asthmatic condition required amphetamine treatment; (2) two track athletes could
not participate in the 100-meter dash because their coach gave them the incorrect
time of the event; (3) the United States Olympic basketball team lost the gold
medal to Russia in a controversial play involving resetting the clock in the final
seconds of the game; and (4) during the May 1973 Commerce Committee hearing,
athletes complained that Olympic officials received first class accommodations
while the athletes were relegated to lesser accommodations. 93 CONG. REc. S15896
(1974) (statement of Sen. Pearson).
91. See 36 U.S.C. § 374 (1988) (listing 14 objectives and purposes of USOC).
92. 36 U.S.C. § 380 (1988). Section 380 provides, in part, the following:
Without the consent of the Corporation, any person who uses for the
purpose of trade, to induce the sale of any goods or services, or to pro-
mote any theatrical exhibition, athletic performance, or competition-
(1) the symbol of the International Olympic Committee, consisting
of 5 interlocking rings;
(2) the emblem of the Corporation, consisting of an escutcheon
having a blue chief and vertically extending red and white bars on
the base with 5 interlocking rings displayed on the chief;
(3) any trademark, trade name, sign, symbol, or insignia falsely rep-
resenting association with, or authorization by, the International
Olympic Committee or the Corporation; or
(4) the words "Olympic", "Olympiad", "Citius Altius Fortius", or any
combination or simulation thereof tending to cause confusion, to
cause mistake, to deceive, or to falsely suggest a connection with the
Corporation or any Olympic activity;
shall be subject to suit in a civil action by the Corporation for the reme-
dies provided in [the Trademark Act of 1946].
36 U.S.C. § 380 (a). However, according to § 380, if the symbols were used prior
to September 21, 1950, their use may continue without interference. 36 U.S.C.
§ 380 (a). For a comprehensive discussion of the Congressional intent and case
law development of § 380, see Steven B. Hay, Comment, Guarding the Olympic Gold:
Protecting the Marketability of Olympic Trademarks Through Section 110 of The Amateur
Sports Act of 1978, 16 Sw. U. L. REv. 461, 464-86 (1986).
93. Hay, supra note 92, at 462-63 & n.15. See generally, 36 U.S.C. § 380(a)
(1988) (providing for exclusive right to use Olympic symbols, emblems, trade-
14
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Circuit held in United States Olympic Committee v. Intelicense Corp.,94 in
enacting section 380, Congress clearly intended "to promote the
United States Olympic effort by entrusting the USOC with unfet-
tered control over the commercial use of Olympic-related designa-
tions."95 The court reasoned that "[t]his would facilitate the
USOC's ability to raise those financial resources from the private
sector that are needed to fund the United States Olympic
Movement."
96
Thus, the market value of USOC licenses was important.97
Moreover, the express language of section 380 "tending to cause
confusion" lessens the burden of proving a traditional trademark
infringement claim, which requires proof of "likelihood of con-
fusion."98
The keystone of common law and statutory trademark infringe-
ment is "likelihood of confusion."99 This term has been interpreted
to mean probability of confusion and proof of actual confusion is
marks and names commercially); 36 U.S.C. § 375(a) (13) (1988) (providing power
to "adopt and alter a corporate seal"); 36 U.S.C. § 375(a) (6) (1988) (providing
power to "sue and be sued").
94. 737 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984).
95. Id. at 266.
96. Id.
97. Stop the Olympic Prison v. United States Olympic Comm., 489 F. Supp.
1112, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (asserting that "section 380 ... evidences a legislative
intent to establish strong protection for Olympic symbols, in part to ensure the
market value of licenses for their use").
98. Intelicense, 737 F.2d at 267 (stating that " 'Congress must have meant to
place less of a burden on a plaintiff under a section 380 cause of action than that
placed upon a plaintiff acting under the Trademark Act alone'") (quoting Inter-
national Olympic Comm. v. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 219 U.S.P.Q. 982, 986
(N.D. Cal. 1982), aff'd, 707 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1983)).
In San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. United States Olympic Comm., a nonprofit cor-
poration in California attempted to make a political statement about the status of
homosexuals in society by conducting the "Gay Olympic Games." 483 U.S. 522,
525 (1987). The USOC sued the corporation to prevent it from using the word
"Olympic." Id. at 527. In affirming the district court's entry of a summary judg-
ment and permanent injunction against San Francisco Arts & Athletics Associa-
tion, the United States Supreme Court held the following:
The protection granted to the USOC's use of the Olympic words and
symbols differs from the normal trademark protection in two respects:
the USOC need not prove that a contested use is likely to cause confu-
sion, and an unauthorized user of the word does not have available the
normal statutory defenses [under the Lanham Act].
Id. at 531 (citing Respondents' Brief at 20, n.17).
99. McCARTHY, supra note 84, § 23.01 [1] (" 'Likelihood of confusion' is the
basic test of both common-law trademark infringement and federal statutory trade-
mark infringement.") (footnotes omitted).
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not required.100 The modem Restatement of Unfair Competition lists
eight factors to be considered in reaching a decision on the issue of
likelihood of confusion and no one issue is determinative. 10 1
Section 380 of the Amateur Sports Act and recent case law in-
terpreting that provision have given the USOC much more power
to prevent misuse of its protected names and symbols. 10 2 In addi-
tion, 18 U.S.C. § 2320(d) makes it a crime to intentionally use
marks "identical with or substantially indistinguishable from"
Olympic symbols.10 3
A. The USOC Flexes its Muscles
Because of the authority given the USOC under section 380 of
the Amateur Sports Act, and as a result of the impact that ambush
marketers have had at the world's major sporting events, Atlanta
Centennial Olympic Properties has embarked on an aggressive
campaign to discourage would-be ambushers during the Summer
Games in Atlanta. 104 The strategy in the Sponsor Protection Pro-
gram (SPP) is designed to achieve the following:
100. Id. at § 23.01 [3] [a] (asserting that "[f] ikelihood of confusion has been
said to be synonymous with 'probable' confusion it is not sufficient if confusion is
merely 'possible' ").
101. The eight factors provided by §§ 20 through 23 of the RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION are summarized as follows:
(1) The degree of resemblance between the conflicting designations;
(2) The similarity of the marketing methods and channels of
distribution;
(3) The characteristics of the prospective purchasers and the degree of
care they exercise;
(4) The degree of distinctiveness of the senior user's mark;
(5) Where the goods or services are not competitive, the likelihood that
prospective buyers would expect the senior user to expand into the
field of the junior user;
(6) Where the goods or services are sold in different territories, the ex-
tent to which the senior user's designation is known in the junior
user's territory;
(7) The intent of the junior user; and
(8) Evidence of actual confusion.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 20-23 (1995).
102. See United States Olympic Comm. v. Intelicense Corp., 737 F.2d 263, 267
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984) (holding that USOC consent is prerequi-
site to marketing Olympic symbol); United States Olympic Comm. v. Union Sport
Apparel, 220 U.S.P.Q. 526 (E.D. Va. 1983) (granting relief to IOC under theory
"akin to that of an anti-dilution statute"); United States Olympic Comm. v. Interna-
tional Fed'n of Bodybuilders, 219 U.S.P.Q. 353, 360-61 (D.D.C. 1982) (same). But
see Stop the Olympic Prison v. United States Olympic Comm., 489 F. Supp. 1112,
1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that § 380 did not prohibit noncommercial use of
Olympic symbols for protest purposes).
103. 18 U.S.C. § 2320(d)(1)(A)(ii) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
104. McKelvey, Atlanta '96, supra note 60, at 432.
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[1.] To preserve the value of sponsor investment in the
Olympic Movement[;]
[2.] To create, implement and manage a program with
pre-emptive, pro-active, and reactive capabilities re-
garding pre-Olympic Games, Olympic Games, and
post-Olympic Games environments[;]
[3.] To reposition ambush marketing in the advertising
industry and among the general public as an unethi-
cal, dangerous and illegitimate business practice[;]
[4.] To increase public awareness that ambush marketing
takes money from U.S. athletes and in effect dimin-
ishes their opportunity to realize Olympic dreams[;]
[5.] To create an intolerance of ambush marketing[; and]
[6.] To maintain the value of corporate sponsor involve-
ment in the Olympic Movement[.] 10 5
In order to accomplish some of the above-stated goals, last
spring, Billy Payne, President of the Atlanta Committee for the
Olympic Games (ACOG), mailed approximately 900 letters to
"leading advertising, public relations and marketing communica-
tions executives across the United States... explaining the dangers
that 'ambush' marketing... poses to the Olympic Movement."10 6
While the public relations campaign is in full swing, one may won-
der whether the Olympic Movement can fight ambush marketers
successfully in light of the 1992 NHL v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Ltd. deci-
sion in Canada.
Participants in the three sponsorship levels at the 1996 Atlanta
Olympic Games have the most to lose. The International Olympic
Committee (IOC) grants the first level, TOP III Sponsors, exclusive
rights to "market themselves worldwide" using Olympic symbols
and trademarks.10 7 The second level sponsorships are the Centen-
nial Olympic Games Partners. 08 The ACOG grants these sponsors
exclusive domestic marketing rights from the local organizing com-
105. Id. at 433-34 (quoting ATLANTA CENTENNIAL OLYMPIC PROPERTIES, ACOP
MANUAL § 3, at 2).
106. ACOG Provides Information on Ambush/Parasite Marketing; Advertising, Public
Relations and Marketing Leaders Targeted, PUB. REL. NEWSWIRE, May 26, 1995, available
in WESTLAW, News File.
107. Skip Rozin, Olympic Partnership, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,July 24, 1995, (Spe-
cial Advertising Section - Insert), at 3. TOP stands for "The Olympic Programme."
Id. TOP III Sponsors include Bausch & Lomb for eye care product advertising,
Coca-Cola for soft drinks, IBM for information systems, Eastman Kodak for imag-
ing, Time Inc./Sports Illustrated for publishing and Visa International for credit
cards. Id.
108. Id.
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mittee in specific product categories.' 09 The third level sponsor-
ships are the Centennial Olympic Games Sponsors."10 These
sponsors have similar rights to the Partners but ACOG defines them
more narrowly."'
The effectiveness of ambush marketing is a cause for Olympic
concern. Take, for example, the advertising statistics from the 1994
Winter Olympics. When asked to identify the restaurant that
sponsored the 1994 Winter Olympics, fifty-seven percent of those
responding said Wendy's.112 Only thirty-seven percent of respon-
dents named McDonald's, the actual Olympic sponsor.1 3 Wendy's
conducted the classic ambush campaign, one that did not involve a
violation of the Amateur Sports Act or the federal trademark
laws.114
B. May the Punishment Fit the Crime?
Bill Ferguson, Director of the ACOG Sponsorship Protection
Program (SPP) explained that his office pursues a variety of meth-
ods in its aggressive attempt to stop ambushing.' 15 If necessary, the
ACOG will directly confront an alleged ambusher with telephone
calls from SPP lawyers, letters, television ads and ultimately law-
suits. 116 Ferguson operates with a $10 million budget and vows to
patrol Atlanta streets looking for ambushers." 7 He stated that:
Parasite marketing devalues the interest in sponsoring,
leaving little incentive for official sponsors. It jeopardizes
the ability to stage the Games and get the athletes there.
In the end, it's not the Jackie Joyner-Kersees and the Carl
Lewises who get hurt, but the grass-roots programs help-
ing the athletes down the street, the kid next door." 8
109. Id. Examples of the 10 Centennial Olympic Game Partners include
Anheuser-Busch, AT&T, Delta Airlines, The Home Depot, McDonald's, Motorola,
Swatch and Champion. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. Examples of Centennial Olympic Games Sponsors include Avon,
BMW, General Motors, BellSouth, Nissan and Holiday Inn. Id.
112. Rozin, supra note 107, at 16.
113. Id.
114. Id. Wendy's ran a creative television ad campaign set in Olympic loca-
tions with former Olympic stars. Id. (citing Darren Coker, ACOG Communications
Director).
115. Telephone Interview with Bill Ferguson, ACOG Director of Sponsorship
Protection (Sept. 15, 1995).
116. Rozin, supra note 107, at 16.
117. Ferguson, supra note 115.
118. Rozin, supra note 107, at 16.
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Several Atlanta businesses have learned first hand exactly how
aggressive the SPP can be. Mailing cease-and-desist letters to poten-
tial ambushers has become commonplace as more than 1000 such
notices have reached potential ambushers. 119 For example, the en-
tertainment complex run by Dave and Busters, Inc., was required to
take down a billboard that read "Olympic-sized fun."120 The
"Olympic Restaurant," established in 1983 and approved by the
State at that time, was recently advised to change the restaurant's
name. The owner complied, at a cost of $1000 and his restaurant is
now called Olympia Restaurant & Pizza. 121 Further, church groups
have been warned not to sponsor "Christian Olympic Games" and
environmental groups have been advised that they cannot sponsor
events with names such as "Trees for Olympic Atlanta Project."122
In light of the NHL v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Ltd.123 decision, a true
ambusher presently is immune from legal attack in Canada.1 24 As
the cases demonstrate, violations of the law exist where companies
are caught marketing counterfeit items or using Olympic markings.
The ambusher does no such thing. Strategies used by Ferguson
and others to counter ambushing in its pure form may only discour-
age the few, but the present status of the law in this area can be said
to encourage the many.
Pressuring event owners to fully protect sponsors by offering
exclusive category sponsorship packages, controlling broadcast and
photographic images, using licensing packages, public embarrass-
ment and legal action will all assist the SPP in achieving its
mission.' 25 Other options include buying broadcast sponsorship as
well as event sponsorship, anticipating potential competitive pro-
motions and using the sponsorship rights purchased fully. 126 Many
of these ambush problems can be cured by good lawyering during
119. Robert Frank, Olympic Flame Singes Some Atlanta Businesses, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 22, 1995, at BI.
120. Id. The company defended their billboard as referring to "local pride"
in the '96 Games. Id. In fact, after a sporting goods convention in Atlanta, SPP
filed lawsuits against five companies for selling unauthorized paraphernalia. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. Olympic officials attributed their aggressive behavior to the threat of
outside companies attempting to profit on the Olympics. Id.
123. 92 D.L.R.4th 349 (B.C. 1992).
124. For a discussion of the NHL v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Ltd. decision and the
apparent immunity for ambushers from legal attack, see supra notes 63-82 & ac-
companying text.
125. Tony Meenaghan, Point of View: Ambush Marketing: Immoral or Imaginative
Practice?, 34J. ADvERTISING REs. 77 (1994).
126. Id.
1996]
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contract negotiations. However, ambushing in its pure form is not
a crime and may not be legally punishable.
V. CONCLUSION
ACOP is aggressively going after ambush marketers, but it is
not clear that what the ambushers are doing is unethical. After
NHL v. Pepsi-Cola Canada, Ltd. it is very clear that what ambushers
are doing is legal in Canada. While American courts are not bound
by this decision, it will probably be reviewed for guidance when and
if the issue is presented. In fact, some say ambushers are engaged
in creative and aggressive advertising. However, millions of dollars
are on the line. Sporting event managers complain about lost spon-
sorship revenues and the confusion between paying sponsor prod-
ucts and ambush marketers. The 1996 Atlanta Summer Olympic
Games promise to not only be an historic event in the context of
the games, but also in the context of the marketplace. The
Olympic officials are perhaps going overboard as they seek to pro-
tect the value of paid sponsorships. It is not at all certain that a
false advertising claim would be successful against a non-sponsoring
business that is merely advertising a product around a major sport-
ing event. Whether the Sponsorship Protection Program is or will
be successful remains to be seen. The question of whether it
should be successful depends on whether your vantage point is am-
busher or sponsor! Given the current state of the law, I would bet
on the ambusher.
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